Time discounting in the public sector remains a source of confusion and some academic controversy. The 
Introduction
It is standard practice, in the quantitative analysis of policies or projects in the public and private sectors, to discount costs or benefits over time, usually at a constant percentage rate per year.
In the private sector this discount rate is conventionally set equal to, or is at least based on, the cost of capital for the activity in question. There are long running debates about the derivation of this private cost of capital, but these debates impinge only occasionally on the public sector. Debate about the conceptual basis for discounting in the public sector has been running for much longer, but views even (or perhaps especially) among economists from different backgrounds differ widely. Debate has also developed more recently about the public sector cost of capital.
The cost of capital is the rate of return required by financiers (adjusted as appropriate for taxes). The private sector cost of capital is the weighted average cost of the relevant debt and equity financing. The government cost of capital is the market cost of government borrowing. This however does not (except for school described below as the efficient markets hypothesis school) define the social discount rate for government. This paper reviews the main conceptual approaches to the social discount rate in government. It is not concerned with the concept described in EC guidance as the financial discount rate for publicly supported commercial projects. 1 Until the 1970s debate about public sector discounting focused on two concepts often described, then as now, as "social opportunity cost" and "social time preference". In the 1970s these were joined by a third model, derived from the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) underlying the then blossoming developments in financial economics. In this EMH model the appropriate discount rates (and costs of capital) for the public sector are defined by those derived for the private sector provision of similar services.
2 These three schools are discussed in turn below. This paper first, in sections 2, 3 and 4, reviews the three most frequently promoted conceptual frameworks for public sector discounting. Section 53 examines in more detail the quantification of social time preference, which is the framework currently recommended for cost-benefit analysis in EU guidance. This quantification is itself subject to many unresolved debates. Sections 6 and 7 briefly review the issues of discounting over the very long term and of comparing public and private financing, which have both become more prominent in recent decades. Section 8 discusses the importance of the public sector discount rate and its practical application. Section 9 concludes. 1 A required financial return on assets is distinct from the cost of capital or a social discount rate. A private enterprise typically exploits whatever monopoly power it may have, to earn not less than its average cost of capital. The required financial rate of return for a public sector commercial activity typically reflects political preferences.
The efficient markets hypothesis and the cost of risk
The efficient markets hypothesis approach to government discounting, popular with many financial economists, is that social time preference is revealed by financial markets. The risk free rate of social time preference is the cost of government borrowing. For many benefit flows a risk premium should be added, equal to the risk premium (mainly to compensate equity finance) for the private financing of a similar activity. Understanding of the issues requires first a review of risk.
Risk

Optimism bias
To many ministers and public service administrators risk means the risk of optimism bias in estimates of costs or timescales or performance. Risk in this sense is important. It is also reflected to some degree in the cost of private (though not public) debt finance -which includes a premium for the risk of the debt not being repaid. However it is common ground, across virtually all of the financial and welfare economics literature and public sector practice, that in general the discount rate should not be used as an instrument for offsetting optimism bias in estimates of costs, timing, or performance.
It is argued instead that the potential for optimism biases should be addressed directly, and the estimates adjusted, or estimated over a plausible range for management to judge explicitly the most likely outcome. Hiding such adjustments in a discount rate premium (the main effect of which in the public sector is usually to give less weight to future costs) clouds or distorts such judgement. The pragmatic use of such a premium by some private sector companies is nonetheless understandable, where the main optimism bias risk lies not in the spending, but in market revenues and how they will grow.
Variability risk
Academic economics literature, whether in financial or welfare economies, says very little about optimism bias, beyond its being something for managers to resolve by making sure that their data are unbiased. The literature invariably uses the word risk in a different sense, to describe variability around the expected outturn. On risk in this sense the welfare literature and, especially, the financial literature is extensive and complex.
It is conventional, and helpful, to distinguish between variability that is random and at least in principle diversifiable, and variability that is correlated with the other variabilities faced by the institution or individual. Non-diversifiable variability is usually described as systematic risk.
Risk that is diversifiable, or non-systematic, is regarded for most practical purposes as costless in the public and in the private sector. The private investor can spread such risks across a diversified portfolio, giving an expected aggregate variability low enough to be of no significance. Public sector risks are generally spread across taxpayers, again reducing the variability faced by any individual to a small fraction of individual income.
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There is however no such consensus among economists about the social cost of systematic variability.
In the most widely used model of financial economics -the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) -the cost of capital for an activity is given by the risk-free rate (generally a government borrowing rate) plus a risk premium equal to the market average risk premium multiplied by a factor (beta) reflecting the correlation between the expected return to the investment and the market average return. If the return is risk-free, as with debt, beta is zero; if the return is expected to fluctuate in exact proportion to the market average (generally the stock market) beta is 1; if it fluctuates in synchrony but with greater amplitude, beta >1; and if, unusually, its fluctuations were countercyclical, beta would be negative.
Within welfare economics the cost (or benefit) of systematic variability is conventionally estimated from first principles, using a utility function in which the marginal utility of extra income declines as the individual's income increases. This can materially affect the estimated value of the benefits of some schemes in developing countries, such as an irrigation scheme which brings most benefit in years when incomes would otherwise have been very low. Such a utility function usually assumes a constant but plausible value for the income elasticity of marginal utility with respect to income (normally abbreviated to the "elasticity of marginal utility"). 4, 5 This first principles approach cannot be used so easily to derive the equity risk premium, which is several times higher than would be expected from a simple calculation based on the standard deviation of equity market fluctuations. The reasons for this "equity premium puzzle" are one area of dissent between economists from different backgrounds.
The efficient markets hypothesis view of government discounting
Under the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) financial market prices reflect all the information that is generally available. There are stronger and weaker versions of the hypothesis, but it is widely assumed in financial economics that fluctuations in the values of stocks and shares in particular are essentially determined by changes in the fundamentals of the activity, such as the use a company's assets, from which the returns are derived, and not materially affected by, for example, fads or fashions among investors (or indeed by naturally reverting cycles in the external world, such as oil crises or wars or business cycles).
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Of course the variability risk imposed by some public investments on individuals -such as the planning uncertainty following a provisional proposal for an infrastructure project -can be a significant social cost; but this is not generally seen as an issue to be handled via the discount rate.
4
Strictly this elasticity is negative, but it is nearly always described as a positive number, denoted here by b. If b is constant, the utility function, where U is utility and Y is income, has the form
If b ≤ 1, the function increases indefinitely; if b > 1 it is asymptotic to a maximum. Given U = f(Y), the marginal utility of income is U' and the income elasticity of U' is YU' '/U' = -b. This view was briefly shaken by a blip in world equity markets in October 1987, triggered by a fall in the Dow Jones Average index of nearly 23 percent in one day for no "fundamental" reason (although it recovered by mid-1988 and there was no material effect on economic activity). In the 1990s Myers (1991, 1996) introduced a section to their leading financial economics textbook headed "No theory is perfect", noting several well established if fairly minor anomalies. They acknowledged that the market may sometimes lose confidence in yesterday's price as the benchmark for adjusting to new information, with a consequent period of confused trading before a new benchmark is established. They also added a footnote saying that "some economists believe that the market price is prone to 'bubbles' [which] can be self-sustaining for a while". In 2000 these notes of caution were absorbed into an expanded section on "Puzzles and Anomalies -What do They Mean for the Financial Manager". In the 2003 edition this was retained with the addition of a new section on "Stock Market Anomalies and Behavioural Finance", and a discussion of the late 1990s dot.com bubble (Brealey and Myers, 2003, pp 356-360) .
However these authors, with others of the EMH school, still reject the concept of significant mean reversion in equity markets. In this view of the world it makes no sense to talk of an equity market as a whole being "high" or "low". The market is assumed to follow a random walk and therefore not fluctuating around any smoother, underlying trend. For example Brealey and Myers (2003, pp 563-4) say as in previous editions that managers generally favour equity rather than debt after an abnormal price rise. The idea is to catch the market while it is high. … But we know that the market has no memory and the cycles that financial mangers seem to rely on do not exist. (emphasis added) To the EMH school an equity risk premium (given a competitive market) measures an inherent social cost of the systematic variability risk of the activity being financed. If the activity is publicly financed instead, this makes little or no difference. The cost of this risk is still there even of it is less visible. No analysis is needed to support this. It is a consequence of the school's model of capital markets. As explained by Sandmo (1972, p300) : … in this model all risks are true risks to society as well as to individuals. Since the sources of risk are to be found in the nature of technology, these sources cannot be removed by changes in society's organisation. This is taken up in more recent UK literature (e.g. Brealey et al, 1997 , Grout, 2003 . In the words of Brealey et al (p23): Perhaps the determining consideration is this (Hirshleifer, 1964; Bailey and Jensen, 1972) : in the presence of complete capital markets, in which the pay-offs to all projects are spanned by existing securities, taxpayers can shed any risk that accrues from the undertaking of a project by the government by trading in the capital markets. The risk premium demanded by the capital markets is the cost of shedding this risk. It is therefore the risk premium demanded for both public-and private-sector projects.
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This does not however explain how the cost an equity premium falls on taxpayers, the users of the tax financed service, or any other party. That taxpayers have such a "risk to shed", when an activity is publicly financed, is taken as read. The contrary view is that the average 6 In practice financial economists appear generally to accept that the systematic risk associated with public expenditure costs is usually very low. These therefore should be discounted at the risk free rate (which is normally lower than estimates of the rate of social time preference). However for discounting benefits there should generally, within the EMH framework, be a significant risk premium, as revealed by the private financing cost of similar activities. equity risk premium arises from the freedom of equity markets and their consequent erratic and occasionally very large fluctuations.
From the perspective of those who see the cost of equity market fluctuations as mainly specific to equity markets, the equity risk premium has little relevance to activities which are publicly financed. 7 As an example consider the improvement of a major road in a developed economy. Were it privately financed, the financing would probably be mostly debt, but it would include an equity component on which a substantial risk premium would be expected. But how might such a premium fall on the nation with public financing? The benefits are clearly correlated with national income: if incomes are higher there will be more users; the development will have more impact on reducing congestion; and the unit value of the time and safety benefits will be greater. However no cost of systematic risk could fall materially on taxpayers: the public financial input would be the initial capital cost and then maintenance costs which, while correlated with use, would be very small relative to the benefits to road users. As for road users, it is hard to see why and how would such a cost fall, beyond the small cost implied by the elasticity of marginal utility.
The EMH paradigm has long faced authoritative challenge. Well before its emergence Keynes, himself a successful investor, saw stock prices as driven largely by short run speculative motives, but the past 20 years has seen a huge literature which seems likely, as suggested in a review by Russell and Torbey (2002) , to lead to some compromise in which perhaps "the hitherto popular EMH paradigm is refined to embody the psychological and speculative aspects of the stock market". However debate about the relevance of the EMH, and hence of equity, to public financing has been more limited.
An early skirmish on the implications of the EMH for publicly financed activities was a critique, by EMH proponents Bailey and Jensen (1972) , of arguments made by Arrow (1965 Arrow ( , 1966 that the public sector may be better able than the private sector to spread some risks. Arrow, with Lind, developed these arguments in the literature's best known paper specifically on public sector variability risk (Arrow and Lind, 1970) . This paper was not seen at the time, by economists not working in financial economics, as particularly contentious, its main conclusion being that spreading variability risks very widely by taxation makes their cost negligible. A thoughtful critique of the paper's assumptions by Foldes and Rees (1977) provided a cautionary note, but this was not seen as an attack on the Arrow and Lind conclusion for most practical purposes. However Arrow and Lind continues to be attacked by EMH proponents (e.g. Klein, 1997 , Currie, 2000 for its explicit rejection of the EMH as then expounded by Hirshleifer (1966) . 8 Arrow and Lind comment for example that "many insurance markets do not exist" and refer to "clear evidence that the existing capital markets are not perfect". Sandmo (1972, pp 287-288) examined the conflict between Arrow and Lind and Hirshleifer. He concluded that "a close examination of the two sets of arguments reveals that they are 7 A common EMH response to such a statement is that it must be wrong, because it implies that the state should finance everything. However it carries no such implications. There are many widely accepted incentive arguments, often far more important than relative financing costs, for the state leaving the supply of most goods or services and their financing to the private sector.
really based on entirely different assumptions concerning the relationship between private and public investment with respect to risk" and that "which set of assumptions is the more realistic one is not easily decided".
However developments in the wider debate about financial markets give reason for confidence in the broad position that equity market fluctuations are driven mainly by investor behaviour rather than by a random walk following fundamentals, supporting the Arrow and Lind position that equity risk premia tell us nothing useful about the social cost of publicly financed activities.
One development is the rise and fall of the dot com market and subsequently of stock markets in general in the 1990s and around the turn of century. This may have been a random walk determined by fundaments and not materially related to investor behaviour. However distinguished commentators such as Wadhwani (1999) were setting out with confidence and in analytical detail, before the general market downturn, reasons why the market appeared to be seriously overvalued.
Second is a parallel finance literature, the first readily accessible text being Mandelbrot and Hudson (2004) , that develops statistical models of financial markets based on fractal analysis. This started in the 1960s, fell out of fashion in the 1970s and 1980s and became something of a fad in the 1990s after the October 1987 blip. Mandelbrot's analysis shows rigorously that equity market fluctuations are very different from the normal, gausssian distribution that is generally assumed in conventional financial economics, and in the simple estimation of the equity risk premium from the standard deviation of the equity market fluctuations.
Third is the steady accumulation of evidence on the dynamic impact of investor behaviour on such markets and on investor attitudes to risk. For example Kirman (1995, p290) presents the results of a simple and tentative, but impressive model of interactive investor behaviour (in the foreign exchange market, but with reference also to equity markets). He explains as follows that the statistical evidence often quoted in support of the EMH is not all as robust as it might appear. … econometric standard tests as to whether the movement of the exchange rate is a random walk -which is what it would have been had it always followed fundamentals and thus satisfied the 'efficient market' criterion -failed to detect the presence of strong deviations from the fundamentals. So these tests do not seem capable of detecting the presence of bubbles in a series which for part of the time follows a random walk. Furthermore wellknown tests for time-dependency in the volatility of series (ARCH, GARCH, etc.) did not reject the presence of such an effect, despite the fact that -by construction -the sort of time structure these tests are supposed to detect was not present in this model.
On another front the application of more sophisticated models of risk aversion, as for example by Benartzi and Thaler (1993) , seems likely to provide plausible, formal explanations of the size of the equity risk premium, given the magnitude of equity market fluctuations. Even the conventional utility model may turn out to be adequate if relative risk aversion is measured in a relevant context and the risk premium properly derived. Thus Barsky et al (1997) obtain empirical values for b in the context of real, large variability of income of 4.2 or 12.1, depending on the method of averaging. They conclude that this cannot explain a premium of 6%, as the financial literature cab suggest, which implies a value for b of over 30, but a more defensible premium of 2%, requiring a value for b of over 10, would bring the measurements much closer. 9 Finally, reading of financial columnists and casual inspection of teaching material on the worldwide web may suggest an increasing acceptance that, although the EMH will continue to thrive and has brought much understanding, equity market fluctuations are explained mainly by the freedom of those markets and investor interaction.
Social opportunity cost
The social opportunity cost (SOC) paradigm for public sector discounting has three variants. All stem from the principle fundamental to economics that the social cost of a resource is measured by its opportunity cost.
In its simpler variants, the SOC paradigm for public sector discounting is seen as the rate of return which the same investment would be expected to earn if it were invested in the private sector. It argues that this rate should itself be used for discounting or, as another variant, that the discount rate should be some weighted average of this SOC rate and a social time preference rate. Among economists advocating an SOC discount rate higher than the STP rate, Baumol (1968) perceived "a basic contradiction" between efficiency in resource allocation between the public and private sectors and the public's time preference, but he inclined, on largely pragmatic grounds, to a rate close to a private sector return. Krutilla and Eckstein (1958) , Sandmo and Drèze (1971) and later Harberger (1976) , proposed a more formal weighting of the discount rate, according to the extent to which the investment was financed from consumption or investment. Feldstein (1973) meanwhile produced a strong critique of this administratively simpler alternative to shadow pricing.
The third, more sophisticated variant accepts that, for comparisons over time, the relevant discount rate is a social time preference (STP) rate, as described in section 3.4.3 below; but it argues that public investment should be given a shadow price, equal to the present value (discounted at the STP rate) of the stream of benefits that investment of a euro in the private sector would have yielded. Early proponents of shadow pricing public investment included Eckstein (1957 Eckstein ( , 1958 Eckstein ( , 1961 10 , Marglin (1963.2) and Feldstein (1964) .
We first address the simpler variants.
A "social opportunity cost" (SOC) discount rate, or an SOC/STP weighted discount rate
In these versions of the SOC paradigm the government discount rate is taken as a social opportunity cost (SOC) rate, equal to the commercial returns achieved by private sector 9
In most financial economics literature the risk premium is derived on the assumption that expected equity yields are defined by the arithmetic mean (following from the assumption of a random walk) so that the expected future rate of exponential growth always exceeds that of the past (by about 2 percentage points for the UK market). It is also often derived on the basis of expected risk-free returns taken from very short term government debt, which are probably lower than those actually expected on long term debt. These conventions lead to high estimates of the equity risk premium.
investment, or of a weighted average of SOC and STP rates. It is always assumed that the SOC rate, derived from private sector returns, is higher than the STP rate.
It is often asserted that a single discount rate, applied without shadow pricing, will generally give near enough the same answer as the combination of a social time preference rate for discounting and a shadow price for public investment.. For example Boscolo et al (1998) , writing about climate change, quote references showing that "the shadow price and the weighted average methods generally yield equivalent results in terms of the ranking of alternative projects". This is unsurprising for comparing projects of similar, medium term horizons, but is far from the case for projects differently distributed over time. Table 3 .1 compares the effects of applying Boscolo et al's alternative formulae, in which they assume an STP rate of 1.5% and an SOC rate of 10%. They combine the STP rate of 1.5% with a shadow price of capital of approximately 2; or, alternatively, use a weighted average discount rate of approximately 8%, with no shadow price of capital. The first row of Table 3 .1 shows the present value of the €100 discounted at the weighted average discount rate of 8%. The second row shows the present value of €100 in year t, discounted at 1.5%, and then multiplied by 0.5 to make it commensurable with the (unspecified) initial investment, with its shadow price of 2. The two procedures are compared in the third row, which suggests that they are broadly equivalent (at best) for only a narrow, even if common set of circumstances. There are however fundamental problem with this interpretation of social opportunity cost.
One problem is that the growth of international financial markets suggests that public investment may in any case have minimal impact on private investment, so undermining the case for any material shadow price on this account. Lind (1990) concluded bluntly (page S-16) that, because of international capital mobility, "the crowding out [of private investment by public investment] that has been the focus of most of the closed economy models does not appear to be very important to the analysis of the social discount rate", so largely dismissing the conventional case for shadow pricing public investment.
A more fundamental weakness is that, even if the assumed SOC rate were the social rate of return from displaced private investment, such a rate could not compound indefinitely into the future. If such compounding were realistic, and the SOC rate were higher than STP, then using an SOC rate would be sound. However indefinite compounding is not possible at a rate which exceeds the long term growth rate of the whole economy. This economy growth rate is less than the currently defensible rate of STP for any European economy. 11 The point is rarely made explicit in the literature. An exception is Rabl (1996) .
A further weakness is that much of the literature implicitly presumes that public sector appraisal is primarily comparing public investment with subsequent benefits in kind. In practice the comparison of alternative cost streams, to achieve broadly given but nonmonetised benefits, is much more common in many public administrations. 12 For comparing the present values of alternative streams of public expenditure any finite opportunity cost is irrelevant, because it applies equally to all costs and benefits. This was set out clearly by Feldstein (1970) .
A further fundamental problem is the issue of how the cost of risk in private financing should be handled in deriving an opportunity cost. The risk premium in private sector returns is a cost, not a benefit, and foregoing it does not incur an opportunity cost. 13 This was set out clearly by Arrow and Lind (1970, p376) . However the assumption in the public sector discount rate literature is nearly always that it is an opportunity cost. The assumptions underlying this appear nowhere to be stated. Two rationales might be constructed, but neither is plausible.
One is the EMH assumption, discussed and rejected above, that publicly financed investment incurs the same social cost of variability risk as that incurred typically by equity financing.
14 In this case the cost would not be an opportunity cost, but counting it as such could give the right answer. The other possible rationale is that the government could in principle invest in such a "private sector" opportunity, to earn the same return, but without incurring the equity risk premium. This might have seemed plausible in the 1960s, but it is now clear that the transition from public to private financing has other consequences, not least for incentives, which, as commented by Arrow (1995.2) , make this an unreal option.
`A further weakness, specific to the use of an SOC discount rate, is that of clarity. Use of a shadow price for public investment, as discussed below, is a black box. But to use instead a higher discount rate encloses the shadow price in a bigger black box. Few users will realise, for example, that the convention is inappropriate for cost-effectiveness analysis, as the convention gives the wrong message about the importance of time. It also conceals its fundamental rationale, which is founded on the relative importance, regardless of time, of public investment and monetised benefits in kind.
Use of an SOC rate, or an SOC/STP weighted discount rate, with no shadow pricing, has however an intuitive and political appeal. It was influential in the setting of public sector discount rates in the UK until the late 1980s and remains influential in many countries and international bodies. The US OMB rate for CBA of 7% (OMB, 2003) is presented as an SOC rate. The UN (Economic Commission for Europe, 2003) and the World Bank (Birdsall and Steer, 1993) , albeit again for CBA applications, adopt SOC or weighted rates.
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This kind of analysis, where discounting is applied to alternative cost streams, with no monetary valuation of public service outputs, is described in this paper as in UK government as "cost-effectiveness analysis". In developed economies it is more common than "cost-benefit analysis", in which some non-marketed outputs are valued.
13
Although it is sometimes argued that the premium is "irrationally" high and that the irrational excess is not a social cost. However even if the premium revealed by the market is irrational it is still a social cost as is, for example, the fear of a person who is terrified of a Martian invasion.
The EC (European Commission, 2002) recommends an SOC rate for financial (as opposed to economic) analysis, but as discussed in Appendix A this is a required rate of return to public sector commercial activities, as mentioned in section 1.
Opportunity cost as a shadow price for public investment
In this more sophisticated version a social time preference rate is used for discounting, but spending on public investment is multiplied by a shadow price, relative to euros of current expenditure or consumption benefit, to reflect its supposedly higher opportunity cost. It remains a popular approach in some American literature (e.g. Boardman et al, 1996) .
It has for over half a century generated much algebra, reflecting assumptions about, for example, how the financing of the public investment is distributed between borrowing and taxation, the consequent impact on private investment, the subsequent social return and its present value (discounted at STP). However the approach has serious limitations.
At the level of practice rather than theory, it very difficult to apply a two stage process of this kind in a government administration. While discounting has long been routinely accepted in the public and private sectors, an investment shadow price would be an extra, unfamiliar complication, which officials and ministers would be unlikely to trust. Whether for these or other reasons, it is in practice used very rarely.
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There is no stable consensus on many of the assumptions needed to derive such a shadow price. It is sometimes argued that each public investment should have its own shadow price, depending on how it is financed. Private sector (average) real accounting returns on assets of double figures are often used, which bear little relation to the marginal social return to private investment.
It is often overlooked that the balance between taxation and borrowing is in any case an issue for macroeconomic optimisation. A competent government adjusts the levels so that, at the margin, the social costs are equal. 16 Thus, for microeconomic analysis of marginal central government spending, the macroeconomic and wider social impact should normally be equivalent for any assumption about the marginal distribution between borrowing and taxation.
Also this version of the SOC paradigm, like the simpler versions, usually wrongly includes a foregone equity risk premium as a lost benefit. It is also entirely unsuitable for comparing public expenditure costs with subsequent savings (i.e. cost-effectiveness analysis), which is the most common use of public sector discounting in many developed economies. However in practical application, if not in its theoretical basis, it is very similar to the use of an STP 15 A social time preference rate is a shadow price. However, while a government discount rate is accepted as a necessary device, the derivation of which can be left to "experts", other shadow prices are generally applied by cost-benefit analysis experts, with skills different from those of officials carrying out most government appraisals. The American Office of Management and Budget guidance however (OMB, 2003) is that this approach for CBA (as opposed to cost effectiveness analysis) is "the analytically preferred means of capturing the effects of government projects on resource allocation in the private sector", but that use of this more sophisticated approach requires OMB concurrence; otherwise a higher "opportunity cost" discount rate of 7% should be used for CBA, with no shadow pricing of public investment.
rate for discounting and a shadow price for all public spending or receipts, to reflect their impact on taxation -a procedure that has in contrast a robust theoretical basis.
The Social Cost of Public Expenditure
The traditional "social opportunity cost" approach to public sector discounting, in one of its variants as just discussed, applies a shadow price to public capital spending. However the superficially similar concept of shadow pricing all public spending (by a constant factor, relative to private spending) has a different academic literature and is analytically robust. It develops the premise that raising an extra €1 of taxation (or correspondingly foregoing €1 of public revenue, say from fees or tolls) imposes a welfare cost equivalent to more than €1 of consumption.
17 This is important to the understanding of discounting in cost-benefit analysis (CBA).
Valuation of this opportunity cost -the marginal social cost of taxation or of public fundsinvolves many factors. One is the marginal administrative cost of tax collection. More complex are other impacts on consumer, employee and corporate behaviour (including private investment). Also relevant are political perspectives, such as the ethical arguments against taxation; and its potentially beneficial impacts on distribution.
Feldstein (1997) makes a strong case for more empirical work in this field. However he estimates, mainly from analysis of the large reduction in US marginal income tax rates between 1985 and 1988, that marginal taxation should be given a shadow price of 2 or more. He notes that the common textbook assumption that a tax increase will reduce aggregate demand, with some consequent fall in tax revenue, does not apply in practice, because other instruments are used to maintain demand; but that many supply impacts, and distortions in the distribution of demand, are usually overlooked or underplayed. Ruggeri (1999) , although largely concerned with the relative impacts of different types of taxation, reviews the literature and suggests shadow prices of around 1.2 to 1.3, based largely on Canadian data, but omitting some behavioural responses considered by Feldstein. Sandmo (1998) notes that taxation has an offsetting redistributive benefit.
A more recent World Bank Research Working Paper (Warlters and Auriol, 2005 ) records a wide range of mainly earlier literature and derives for African countries shadow prices of around 1.2.
Another approach is to examine how governments trade consumption benefits against public spending in approving projects such as roads, where many benefits such as time savings are monetised consumption values. In the UK this would imply a ratio almost certainly greater than 1.5, although there are few if any such cases where decisions are not materially influenced by other, non-monetised costs or benefits, such as negative environmental impacts.
This shadow price might be applied as a multiplier of more than unity to public expenditure. However administrators and ministers might be sceptical of economists' insistence that the money units in their expenditure budgets should be multiplied by some insecurely based factor before they are used in policy or project appraisal. It would be more realistic to retain public expenditure as the numeraire for CBA and, as in many public administrations, apply public expenditure rationing as a minimum acceptable benefit/cost ratio. Alternatively the shadow price could be made explicit by applying it as a multiplier less than unity to any quantity measured in units of consumption, as are most benefits in CBA. Applying the shadow price to consumption benefits would be administratively much easier than applying it to public spending, because it would apply to only the minority of cases which include consumption valuations 18 , and because such valuations, in CBA, are often under the control of economists themselves.
In the UK public sector this concept is informally but publicly recognised (with Finance Ministry approval) in guidance on cost-benefit analysis in transport, which records that "this principle (known as the Social Opportunity Cost of Exchequer Funds or SOCEF) might imply a 30% uplift to expenditure costs" (Department for Transport (2004-6) paragraph 13). Australian Guidance (Department of Finance and Administration, 2006, pp 37) suggests a 25% uplift (although for practical application this is subsumed in a "social opportunity cost" discount rate, as discussed in section 2.1 above).
Social time preference
Social time preference (STP), as normally defined, is the time preference of the population as a whole for marginal income.
Leading early exponents of an STP rate for public sector analysis were Eckstein (1958) and Feldstein (1964) and later an influential paper by Bradford (1975) . Others, taking a growth theory perspective, were Marglin ( .1, 1963 .2) and Arrow (1965 Arrow ( , 1966 , the latter work being developed into a powerful book by Arrow and Kurz (1970) . All these authors adopted the principle that the social value of a proposal is the present value of all its impacts on consumption, discounted at the STP rate for consumption. As the basis for deriving the rate of STP they mostly 19 promoted equation (1) below.
STP = a + bg
(1) Where a = pure time preference; b = income elasticity of the marginal utility of income (with sign reversed); and g = rate of growth of per capita income.
The algebra is well set out by Feldstein (1965) . The term a -time preference for marginal utility -defines the extent to which the current population (or its government) cares about future marginal utility. The term bg measures the extent to which the utility gained by a marginal euro declines with increasing income.
Although it is defined as a time preference rate for marginal consumption it can equally be applied to other monetary numeraires, including public expenditure, so long as all the quantities are expressed in, or converted to the same numeraire.
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Most public sector appraisal is concerned with cost-effectiveness analysis (i.e. finding the best way to delver a broadly given output), or with the comparing monetised costs with benefits that are not explicitly valued in monetary terms.
19 Marglin (1963.1) boldly proposed deriving an STP rate from macroeconomic optimisation of the growth rate and the level of investment, as these were variables on which politicians could be expected to express policy preferences.
The valuation of neither a nor b is straightforward and some governments regard the difficulties as insuperable. However there is enough consensus in the literature to derive values for most developed economies that are precise enough for operational use.
The Practical Choice of Conceptual Basis by National Governments
Appendix A summarises the handling of public sector discounting in ten OECD countries and by the European Commission. It illustrates a striking lack of international consensus.
Following from the arguments set out above, the case for comparing public expenditures over time by a social time preference rate is robust.
For cost-effectiveness analysis, private sector returns, whether perceived in terms of a social opportunity cost or via CAPM as a direct social cost, are irrelevant, as well explained by Feldstein over 30 years ago. This probably covers most applications of discounting in central government in most developed economies.
Less straightforward is the comparison in cost-benefit analysis of public expenditure costs with costs and benefits a that are social costs or benefits measured in the numeraire of consumption. There are convincing arguments for giving more weight to a euro of public expenditure than to a euro of consumption. However, contrary to the assertions made or assumed by some authorities, this cannot be satisfactory handled by a premium on the discount rate. It is better handled by using the social time preference rate for comparisons over time, combined either with a convention that a benefit/cost ratio (with public spending as the denominator) of significantly more than one is needed for such an investment to be taken seriously, or by explicitly multiplying the quantities measured in a consumption numeraire by some factor less than one.
The Valuation of Social Time Preference
3.1
The Discount Rate Price Base: Real Rates, Nominal Rates and Utility Rates An issue on which there is general agreement across all schools of economics, but is a persistent source of confusion in practical application, is the handling of expected changes in prices over time. Confusion arises both with general inflation and in the handling of relative prices.
In nearly all economies some general increase in prices is expected over time. Thus future monetary values may be expressed in "nominal terms", that is their expected future euro values, or they may be expressed in "real terms", that is in units of a constant money value (i.e. the value of money in some defined year, or at some more precise date). Analysis by economists is normally undertaken, for greater convenience, in real terms. When values expressed in real terms are discounted over time they need to be discounted at a "real" discount rate, which excludes general inflation. 20 Public sector discount rates are usually expressed as real rates.
increase over time in real terms, that is at a rate higher than general inflation. Many land values increase over time. Other prices, such as those of many manufactured goods or the price of a computer of a given capacity, may be expected to continue to fall over time in real times. These "real" price changes should of course be included in an analysis carried out in real terms.
Confusion sometimes arises from the misleading use of terms such as "in constant 2005 prices" to mean "in constant 2005 money value". Such confusion would be avoided if projections of monetary quantities in real terms were always described as being in constant money value, and never as being in constant prices.
There are some impacts, such as marginal changes in the probability of death or injury, or QALYs (quality adjusted life years), where the unit of measurement may for practical purposes uses be near enough to a measure of a change in utility. In this case it can be a useful short cut, to be used with care, to discount such quantities at the pure or utility discount rate a. However few if any government administrations appears to handle the discounting of such benefits in a way that is analytically robust -as well set out by Smith and Gravelle (2000).
Pure Time Preference
The value of pure time preference -a in equation (1) -is mainly an ethical choice, about the relative weighting of the marginal utility of today's population and that of future populations. However there appears to be no solid empirical data on the preferences of people in general. Debate is therefore dominated by judgement based on anecdotal evidence or, often, by the personal judgements of individual experts.
Pigou (1920) and Ramsey (1928) , like a minority of later authorities 21 , considered that discounting future relative to present marginal utility was irrational for individuals and ethically unsatisfactory for governments. However, as set out clearly by Schelling (1995) , this does not reflect the preferences of people in general, whose concern for future generations (as for those in other countries), may be considerable but is evidently less than their concern for those with whom they have a closer affinity. It is not clear that economics, or any other profession, has a special claim to pronounce on this ethical judgement. Kopp and Portney (1999) comment as follows on the coverage of discounting by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change:
The [IPCC's] prescriptive approach is premised on the view that there is an ethically or morally "correct" rate of discount to use in project evaluation -a rate that is independent of the views of the present generation (save, of course, those who get to determine what the morally just rate is). Yet those of us who teach benefit-cost analysis and advocate its use in public policymaking generally point approvingly to its democratic nature. That is, we argue that BCA is attractive because it is based in the preferences of all those around today. Marglin (1963.1 ) expanded on the same point forty years ago: "I consider it axiomatic that a democratic government effects only the preferences of the individuals who are presently members of the body politic", and Eckstein (1957, p75) , expressly refuting Ramsey: "I assume [discounting of future utility] because I believe that a social welfare function based on consumer sovereignty must accept people's tastes, including their intertemporal preferences".
A more pragmatic, but powerful objection to a zero rate of pure time preference is that it implies a patently unrealistic level of investment, as first noted by Ramsey (1928, p 548) , set out in qualitative terms by Hayek (1936, p 46) and much more formally by Koopmans (1960) and Koopmans et al (1964) , and explained more clearly by Arrow (1995.2, p 16) . A zero rate implies, regardless of the return on investment (provided the return is positive), a savings rate of 1/b, where b is the elasticity in equation (1). A plausible value for b of around 1.5 thus implies a savings rate of about 2/3. Pure time preference is sometimes derived from the individual risk of death (e.g. Eckstein, 1961; Kula, 1984 Kula, , 1985 Pearce and Ulph, 1995; Evans, 2005; Evans and Sezer, 2005) . However the rationale for such estimates seems weak. If people were wholly altruistic, individual mortality would be irrelevant. Its effect on a would be zero. If, at the other extreme, people cared not at all for those surviving them, mortality would imply discount factors for marginal utility declining to virtually zero within less than a century. Authors applying this approach generally adopt the second, "zero altruism" rationale for the first year (i.e. discount at a rate equal to the risk of death for an average person in the next year) and then apply this as a constant rate for all time. Evans (2005) reports average death rates in recent years of about 1% of France, Germany, the UK, Japan and the USA. However applying this discount rate to all future years is applying the zero altruism preferences of future populations about each subsequent year, whereas the relevant preferences are those of today's population, including some altruism. The approach (misleadingly) avoids the core issue of how much today's society cares (or for that matter should care) about future societies.
Aside from those who believe that pure time preference should be zero, there is some consensus in the literature on a value over a few decades of around 1.5% per year, if an element is included for the risk of natural or man made catastrophe eliminating many of the prospective costs or benefits. 
The Elasticity of Marginal Utility
The valuation of the elasticity of marginal utility, defining the variable b in equation (1), has a large and diverse literature. Cowell and Gardiner (2000) , in a review of studies of UK data, note that there are three broad approaches to measuring this elasticity -direct enquiry; inference from private behaviour; and inference from how governments appear to incorporate distributional issues into their decision-making. They note that the evidence available is more relevant to the social valuation of (contemporary) inequality and to attitudes to risk, than to marginal satisfaction from income or consumption. The status of evidence on marginal satisfaction, as needed for equation (1), they describe as dubious.
We here discuss first the moral dimension of b and then the several ways in which it has been estimated.
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Very few authors, apart from those advocating a zero rate, commit themselves to an explicit estimate of a. Little and Mirrlees (1974, p266) , while expressing sympathy with the zero rate view, suggest that "in any case it would probably not mean an addition [to time preference] of more than 2% or 3% per year". More widely quoted is Scott, who supposed that, in periods of stable inflation, STP has been indicated by the post tax return on low risk savings. In Scott and Dowley (1997) , on the basis mainly of data for the half century before World War I, estimate a value for a of 0.5%, but suggest, "since the risk of total destruction of our society has increased", "a best estimate" for a of 1.5.%. Subsequently, using post WW II and pre WW I data on post tax returns to equity, Scott (1989, pp 230-231) estimates a value for a of 1.3% -and also examines (p233) a higher value for a of 2.5% suggested by Stern (1977) .
5.2.1.
The moral dimension
Equation (1) combines one term, a, which is essentially ethical, with another, bg, which as usually applied is wholly utilitarian. The term bg, though concerned with income distribution, ignores, as in the STP literature generally, any moral aspect of transfers from poorer to richer populations.
23 Yet many might argue that "fairness" or "egalitarian" concerns would justify rather less redistribution (and certainly no more) from poorer to richer than implied by the simple utilitarian criterion of maximising the sum of individual utilities. This would imply for STP purposes a higher value of b.
The economics literature provides little quantitative evidence of public preferences in this respect. Cowell and Gardiner (2000, p23) report some "empirical measurement of inequality aversion", but with widely dispersed results. The political philosophy literature, driven especially by Rawls (1971) , and the related political economics literature (e.g. Sen, 1997 , Atkinson, 1996 , discuss distribution and utilitarianism with insight, but without extending to empirical measurement of people's preferences. The psychology literature offers more, but within frameworks that do not differentiate between declining marginal utility and other reasons for distributional preferences. However Michelbach et al (2003) report that nearly 20% of their subjects supported the Rawlsian principle of maximising the welfare of the least advantaged, a further 15% were strict egalitarians preferring, within wide limits, to maximise equality at the expense of efficiency, and only some 13% were strict efficiency maximisers, as the utilitarian criterion would imply. This suggests that egalitarian preferences may add materially to preferences based on utility maximisation. 
Derivation of b from the personal tax regime
Derivation of b from the tax regime conventionally assumes that the schedule of income tax rates against income is based on the principle of "equal absolute sacrifice" (i.e. an equal loss of utility for each marginal euro of tax paid). Combining this principle with a constantelasticity utility function, as used in deriving equation (1) above, leads to the derivation of an implicit value for b.
Strengths of this approach are its conceptual simplicity and measurability, and that it may also include concern about fairness as well as marginal utility; but it has evident limitations.
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One is that social concern about contemporary inequality might differ from that about inequality over time. Another, perhaps the most serious, is that personal taxation in many countries, especially in recent decades, has become increasingly influenced by concerns about incentives and personal freedom as distinct from fairness. This will bias downwards estimates of b based on the assumption of equal absolute sacrifice. Further problems are that personal tax schedules may be interpreted in different ways with regard for example to the 23 A rare exception is a comment by Newbery (1992, p11 ) that"[HM Treasury's] preferred value of [b] is 1.5, which is quite egalitarian, and one might quite reasonably defend a value of 1.0 or even less." This comment implies that the value of b incorporates an ethical judgment, which perhaps it should, although it was not part of the Treasury's logic at that time.
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As with most such studies, the subjects were university students. They were however from two institutions and diverse backgrounds; and the authors found no correlation of preferences with age. This work was also concerned with contemporary income distribution within a nation, rather than comparisons across nations or over time, where egalitarian preferences might be less.
inclusion or exclusion of the standard personal allowance of other allowances, and that they are by no means the only policy instrument geared to income distribution. These latter concerns are carefully discussed by Evans (2005 (2005) present results for large number of OECD countries, deriving an average value close to 1.4 with a perhaps surprisingly narrow spread of about ± 0.2.
The derivation by Stern (1977) for the UK income tax regime in 1973-74, before concerns about tax incentives became so prominent, may give a better measure of social judgments about the utility of marginal income marginal across the income distribution. Stern derived a value for b of 1.97, although Evans (2005) suggests that Stern's inclusion of the standard personal tax allowance notes that this gives a strong upward bias to b at relatively low levels of income. For US income tax from 1948 to 1965, Mera (1969, p469) found that "for a major portion of the income range" the rates implied a value for b of 1.5.
Derivation of b from personal savings behaviour
Many econometric studies of household savings behaviour over the life cycle estimate the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution of household consumption. Under certain fairly restrictive assumptions, as set out by Cowell and Gardiner (2000, Appendix A3 ) the reciprocal of this quantity is equal to the household elasticity of marginal utility. Cowell and Gardiner consider some of this work, in particular Blundell et al (1994) on UK data. They note that the two principal models in Also on the basis of Blundell et al, Pearce and Ulph (1995) propose a value for b of 0.8 to 0.9. However they consider only one of the two principal models of Blundell et al; and they do not discuss the implications of the very strong increase, for that model, in the elasticity with income.
27 Barsky et al (1997) measure the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution directly by means of survey questions from the US Health and Retirement Survey. They obtain a mean value of 0.18, which implies a high value for b of 5.6. They also measure relative risk aversion directly, as described below, and conclude that, although the average values they obtain are similarly high, there is no correlation across individuals between their inter-temporal elasticity and risk aversion.
26 Evans (2005) suggests that NICs should be ignored because the notionally insurance-based rationale for such deductions is "completely different" from that underlying income tax rates. In practice the contributions are widely seen to serve in effect as a (politically convenient) form of income tax, but, as Evans implies, it is hard to believe that the regime was ever designed other than to minimise disincentives for a given total NIC revenue. This however has for many years been increasingly the objective of income tax regimes as well!
27
The strong income dependence of the elasticities in this version of the model (in which a dummy variable is introduced to allow an adjustment for the high real interest rates of the early 1990s), and the substantial change in the estimated magnitudes, invite exceptional doubt about the reliability of this particular result.
We noted above that for a = 0 the optimum savings ratio is 1/b. The actual savings ratio, together with assumptions for a and for the long run rate of return, yields an implicit value for b. Stern (p220) records that for a savings ratio of 10%, a post tax rate of return of 5% (plausible figures for the UK in the 1960s) and a = 2.5%, the implicit value of b is approximately 5 (and is higher for lower values of a).
However, although such studies need to be included in any review of empirical evidence on the value of b, they suggest that personal savings behaviour has little relevance to the changes in the marginal utility of income to society over time and income.
5.2.4.
Derivation of b from direct evidence on personal risk aversion Barsky et al (1997) report empirical measures of b (defined in this case as relative risk aversion) of US respondents between the ages of 51 and 61 in 1992. The arithmetic average value was 12.1. However the distribution of values was very skewed and the authors give more weight to measures of the reciprocal, which they define as relative risk tolerance, for which the arithmetic average value was 0.24, implying a value for b of 4.2. These high values relate however to very significant risks to income, where other factors such as the potential for regret would be expected to increase risk aversion. 
Derivation of b from income and price elasticities
An approach with a long history (Fisher, 1927 , Frisch, 1932 , 1959 estimates b from the income and price elasticities of a preference independent good such as food (i.e. a good that contributes an additively separable component to the user's utility). Frisch (1959, equation 64) shows that ) /( ) 1 (
, where E i is the income elasticity of demand for the ith good, a i the budget share and e ii the own (uncompensated) price elasticity. Brown and Deaton (1972, p1206) report studies by other authors of data from several countries, and also work of their own on UK data for 1900-1970 that gave a value of for b of 2.8. They conclude that "though estimates obtained this way [from linear expenditure systems] fluctuate considerably and some are very large, an average value of -2 for [-b] seems consistent both with most such studies and with the results from fitting other models". Kula (1984) reports values for b derived in this way for the US of 1.89 and for Canada of 1.56. For the UK, Kula (1985) derives a markedly lower value of 0.71. More recently Evans and Sezer (2002) derive for the UK a value of 1.6. Subsequently Evans (2004.1) has further examined alternative specifications, deriving values for the UK of 1.6 (as above) by a CEM (constant elasticities model) and 1.2 by an AIDS (almost ideal demand system), and for France (Evans 2004 .2) values of 1.8 and 1.3.
The validity of some of the assumptions, such as the constancy of the relevant demand functions over time and income, is difficult to assess, and there are problems of data and definitions. The substantial effect of the model specification sounds a note of caution. This approach has nonetheless the great merit of being a direct measure of b, albeit without the possible extra moral component, and it has been subject to empirical studies in many countries and over different goods.
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As suggested in section 3.4.1 above, they may therefore be more relevant to the equity risk premium.
5.2.6.
Derivation of b from intuition
Another approach is thought experiment. A value for b of 1 implies that, ceteris paribus, an extra €1 to someone with an income of €x should be given twice the weight of an extra €1 to someone with an income of €2x. Values for b of 1.5 and 2 would imply factors of respectively 2.8 (2 1.5 ) and 4 (2 2 ). However although the judgement required is conceptually fairly simple, there are few points of reference by which to judge what is plausible.
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However Scott and Dowley (1977) advance the argument, maintained in Scott (1989) , and which they report has the support of Little and Mirrlees and of Stern, that "it is reasonable to suppose that there is a maximum level of utility which anyone can derive from income", in which case " [b] must exceed one at least above some income level, although it could still be less than one for low levels of income". This seems a fairly persuasive argument. et al (1998, p7) conclude that "the few available estimates suggest that the elasticity of marginal utility [ranges] from 1 to 2"; and Arrow (1995.1, p 6) suggests, on the basis of "rather thin evidence", 1.5 to 2.0.
In the UK literature, Stern's review of 1977 concludes that the evidence then pointed to the range of 1 to 10, with measurements based on consumer behaviour pointing to the middle of the range, and those based on government behaviour to around 2. Scott (1977 Scott ( , 1989 , working back from market rates, estimates a value of 1.5. Little and Mirrlees (1974, p 240) suggest that "on admittedly extremely inadequate evidence, we guess that most people would put [b] in the range 1-3". Cowell and Gardiner (2000) conclude that the evidence supports a value in the range of 0.5 to 4, within which they give most weight to the range of 1.2-1.4 derived, as explained above, from the personal tax regime of the late 1990s. Evans (2005) regards a figure of 1.4, derived from the personal tax regimes of a large number of countries, and not inconsistent with derivations from food income and price elasticities, as a plausible result for many countries, but subject to more work on consumption behaviour.
Discounting Over the Very Long Term
Where substantial impacts are projected beyond 30 or 40 years ahead, extending perhaps over centuries or even millennia, some issues that can be ignored as trivial when discounting over a few decades become important.
One fundamental reason for not applying a constant discount rate indefinitely arises from uncertainty about the rate. To illustrate this, suppose that the discount rate were believed to be either 2% or 4%, with equal likelihood. Although Stern's comment (p243) that a value "of around 5 does not seem ludicrously large" might for most applications be questioned.
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One obvious counterargument is that the ultra rich may gain utility from knowing that they are relatively richer even than the super rich. However it is hard to imagine that this is material to the personal utility impact of a marginal change in taxation; and in any case such comparative concerns apply much more weakly to a nation as a whole than to individuals within it.
obtained by discounting €1 million at respectively 2% and 4%. Row 3 shows the average of these present values. Row 4 shows the discount rate that would give the present value in row 3. The period of 30 years, in the first column, is towards the end of or beyond most practical discounting periods and the effective discount rate, at 2.85%, is still close enough for practical purposes to the average of 2% and 4%. However over much longer periods the effective discount rate falls heavily towards 2%. This effect is amplified by the increasing uncertainty over time about the components of the STP rate, such as the rate of per capita income growth, the marginal utility of income of distant generations, and the extent to which today's society would empathise with them.
On the other hand many of the very long term impacts of policy interest are direct impacts on welfare, in terms such as safety or health, whose marginal utility may be almost independent of income. In such cases, as noted above, it is the pure time preference that determines the extent to which they are discounted over time, in which case uncertainties about b or g are not important.
It is becoming accepted in the literature that people discriminate more weakly between more distant time periods. Schelling (1995) sets this out in terms of people's level of identification with other people or populations. 2) note empirical support for a decline in the rate of pure time preference in the very long-term, with evidence from behaviour in markets, stated preference studies of attitudes to risk 31 , saving behaviour, and the safety regulation activities of government.
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These effects of uncertainty and levelling out of pure time preference over time provide a convincing case for discounting at lower rates in the very long term -if and when compound discounting is an appropriate technique.
The appropriateness of discounting in very long term analysis is however questionable. For impacts that fall largely in the short and medium term but also extend into the very long-term, 31 Although one of the most widely quoted stated preference studies (Cropper et al, 1994) reported such high values for pure time preference (for example that people are indifferent between one accidental death this year and two accidental deaths in 5 years time), that it seems likely that the techniques need further development.
it may be reasonable to use conventional cost-benefit analysis, with lower (but not zero) discount rates for years beyond say half a century, if it makes a material difference.
33
However for policies dominated by the very long-term, such as climate change, it is hard to see a case today for calculating present values of very long-term impacts.
Economics has little to contribute to the weight which governments should give to the very long-term. Approaches are needed which, in the words of Nordhaus (1999) allow public decision-makers "to weigh options explicitly, rather than allowing technicians to hide the choices in abstruse arguments". As an illustration Nordhaus calculates the effects on annual world income in perpetuity of reducing the (500 year) temperature change by varying amounts. Policymakers can devise a response based on such information, while, in Nordhaus's words, "focusing on ultimate objectives". 2) find Nordhaus's policy advisory approach to global warming persuasive, in terms of practicality and presentational clarity.
Toman (1999, p 34) suggests a common sense approach as follows:
In a political decision setting, rather than simply calculating a net present value of benefits minus costs … the present value of the risk reduction costs to be borne by the current generation could be presented to decision-makers and the public, along with estimates of the ultimate effects (monetary and otherwise) of risk reduction in time and space. Decisionmakers and others then have to weigh whether the benefits justify the costs.
The case against deriving present values of very long term impacts is strengthened by the confusion, especially severe in such contexts, between valuation and discounting.
One valuation issue is the need to distinguish between marginal and intramarginal impacts. For example valuation of the destruction of a society by a rise in sea level needs an ethical judgement, not merely an estimate of the cost of moving the population and the lost national product. And what today's society regards as important may in the future be considered unimportant, or vice versa, because of changes in technology and social preferences. Today's technology and many of today's social concerns would have been far beyond the imagination of governments 200 years ago. Judgement about what will matter to our distant descendents needs common sense as much as analysis.
The costs of mitigating climate change appear to fall on the present developed economies, and most of the long-term benefits, of reduced impacts on sea level and climate change, appear to fall on developing countries. Schelling (1999) , with logic, presents this as an issue of overseas aid. On the other hand, the developed economies are also the main producers and beneficiaries of the emissions. This all contributes to an ethical maze, which present value estimates seem more likely to confuse than to enlighten.
The Comparison of Public and Private Financing of Public Services
For many years governments have needed sometimes to compare the costs and benefits of leasing rather than owning assets such as buildings. More recently, since the 1980s, the issues have become more important and more complex with the emergence of widespread private financing of other public service assets and services. Such financing decisions are often largely political, but the analysis applied to financing comparisons is rarely analytically robust.
A company typically uses its cost of capital as the underlying discount rate for investment appraisal. For government, the relevant time discount rate is social time preference, which is in contrast conceptually different from the government's cost of capital, which derives from the government borrowing cost.
This government borrowing cost, before comparison with private financing costs, needs to be adjusted for the corporate tax paid by the private sector. More contentious, as with discounting, is the basis of any further adjustment for risk. Any public/private financing comparison obviously needs to adjust the expected costs with public financing for optimism bias, the risk of which, with private financing, is partly or wholly transferred to the supplier. However for the equity risk premium the same arguments apply as with the discount rate, suggesting that, other than to the EMH school, the equity risk premium is not material to the cost of public financing.
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The distinction between the cost of capital and the time preference rate is often overlooked in the literature. For example Lind (1990, p S-23) says "[For] a lease or buy decision … clearly, the government's borrowing rate is appropriate [for discounting] in a world where crowding out is not a significant problem. From the taxpayer's point of view, it will minimize their cost whether they choose to pay it now or defer it to the future through government borrowing."
The unmentioned need to adjust for tax is no doubt implicit. However there is also no qualification about time preference. If the government cost of capital borrowing rate differs from the time preference rate then the public interest is not strictly best served by also discounting over time at the cost of capital. A rigorous calculation would estimate the alternative financing streams of depreciation and cost of capital payments over the project lifetime and then discount both at the STP rate. Such explicit use of both the government borrowing rate and a time preference rate in the same calculation might be administratively unworkable as a standard procedure; but this does not preclude analysis from first principles where it may make an important difference. For most cases, even if the numbers are different, the approach advocated by Lind should suffice. 
Discussion
We here discuss the practical importance of the public sector discount rate, how rates are chosen in practice and what this implies for research needs.
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However external advisers on such projects are often committed to the EMH conceptual framework.
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Current UK government procedures (HM Treasury, 2003 .2) display the opposite oversight to Lind, in not recognising the significance of the government borrowing rate as the basis of the cost of capital. The STP discount rate, as it happens, is numerically close to the borrowing rate plus a plausible average tax adjustment, and might therefore be used as both a tax-adjusted cost of capital and a discount rate. However a further tax adjustment is double counting, in favour of private financing.
The practical importance of the public sector discount rate
Public sector discounting has been subject to extended debate, but rarely is there discussion of how much the choice of number matters in practice. It is sometimes important, but this importance is sometimes overstated.
Indeed a danger of discounting is that it gives misleading precision. An outstanding paper by Lind (1982) , perhaps the most influential on the subject ever written, quoted as an example of the importance of discounting a range of figures current in the 1970s for the US fast breeder nuclear reactor (FBR) programme. The estimated net present value of that programme fell from $46.8 billion to $16 billion when the discount rate was raised from 7.5% to 10%. Lind further commented that "small variations" in the discount rate will often tip the balance between a positive and negative present value. However in the event the net present value of the US FBR programme has probably been substantially negative with any discount rate, as in the UK, because strategic issues, such as the costs and public acceptability of nuclear power, processing costs, decommissioning costs and the availability and price of uranium and perhaps of other fuels, were misjudged, and there is little commercial demand for FBR technology. It thus stands now as an example, among others, of the dangers of discounting diverting attention from key assumptions, which may be very much more important than even a few points either way on the discount rate.
It follows that any government conventions need to place discounting firmly within a policy analysis framework which directs attention towards, rather than away from the most important issues for analysis and policy judgement. This is especially important for policy analysis of issues where important issues are extremely uncertain and need careful, informed judgement. This was true for FBR policy. It also true today of climate change policy, as discussed in section 6 above. Even the use of discounting may, as in the case of climate change, give a misleading impression of completeness and accuracy.
However the discount rate can have a significant impact on choice of technique, for example in the trade-off between capital and maintenance spending in the provision of roads, or of military vehicles. It can be important for decision making about the budgeting of a few public agencies responsible for activities such as forestry or the building of dams, which are unusually capital intensive and face a long interval between expenditure and benefits. Also when, as is often the case, it is used both for discounting and implicitly as a public sector cost of capital, it can sometimes have a significant effect on the apparent comparative costs of public and private financing of a public service asset.
How public sector discount rates are chosen in practice
As illustrated in Table A1 in Appendix A, different governments, across countries and within countries over time, choose a wide range of numbers (for reasons little related to different characteristics of their economies) and for a wide range of declared rationales. Further diversity is fund in international bodies as illustrated in section 3.1.
This appears to reflect a number of factors.
On factor is the inability of economists within government or academia to provide consistent advice. Indeed it seems not uncommon for different influential groups of economists to offer, with conviction, inconsistent advice. On the fundamental principles there are often advocates of social time preference, with others advocating opportunity cost rates based on private sector commercial returns on assets, and others advocating returns based on the EMH, mimicking the private cost of capital for similar activities. Among advocates of social time preference, different academic and other advisers may hold markedly different views on the valuation both of pure time preference and of the elasticity of marginal utility. Expert advisers may also hold differing views on the handling of the very long term.
The lack of professional consensus appears often to leave the way open for the influence both of intuitively appealing but incorrect technical assumptions, and for pressure from ministers and officials, and other interest groups, to move the discount rate in ways in which they believe will help their own policy agendas.
It is often assumed, for example, that the chosen number will have impacts that in practice it does not have. It may be assumed for example that a low rate will help significantly to promote a high level of public investment, whereas in practice the level of investment is usually determined overwhelmingly by budget constraints, which are very little influenced by the discount rate. It is also sometimes assumed that a high rate will increase the efficiency of public spending; but although activities yielding high social rates of return are generally preferable to those yielding lower returns, it is a fallacy to suppose that a low discount rate drives out high yielding expenditure, and a higher rate than STP distorts decision making against the longer term.
Governments wishing to encourage private financing may favour any conventions that help to achieve this, including a high public sector discount rate if this also to be used as a public cost of capital for comparing public and private financing. Public agencies with large capital investment programmes will press for low rates. Some non-government organisations, or a government seeking their favour, may seek low discount rates for discounting over the very long term.
Ministers and many senior officials are likely to dislike technical jargon and strongly favour rationales that they can comfortably explain. They are therefore likely to find "opportunity cost" or "private sector analogue" frameworks more appealing than social time preference. Senior officials may also seek to cut through the squabbling of the technical "experts" with a simple, imposed solution. This is illustrated by the OMB imposition in the USA of the government borrowing rate for most purposes (with, for cost-benefit analysis, the alternatives of either a higher rate, or, with OMB approval, the lower rate with a shadow price for public investment of public spending).
Research needs
It is probably inevitable that the setting of national discount rates will continue be driven largely by the personal perceptions of the ministers or senior officials in positions of most influence. Academic work will not change this. Nor will any single method of deriving figures, for either pure time preference or the elasticity of marginal utility, ever be universally accepted -most ministers and officials will make use of whatever work by reputable authors supports their preferred numbers, regardless of its quality.
However continuing academic work on the numbers is important, both to help support those within governments looking for sound analysis and to influence over time the sea of ideas within which the personal views of minsters and their advisers are formed.
The biggest gap appears to be absence of work on public preferences about how much weight the government should give to the marginal utility of future populations.
Two further areas of work deserve a high priority if robust analytical frameworks are to be developed and retained. One area is the need to address the ever present arguments from financial economics that CAPM provides the answers. The other is the need to address the issue of comparing public expenditures with costs and benefits measured in consumption values. Only when this is more widely understood, and seen in terms of the distortionary effects of taxation as opposed to merely the displacement of private sector investment, will the arguments for high discount rates for cost-benefit analysis, used widely in international organisations but seemingly based on unsound logic, be clarified and improved.
Conclusion
The proper conceptual basis for public sector discounting is in most circumstances the rate of social time preference for marginal income. Mainstream welfare economics derives this rate as the sum of two components -one quantifying time preference for marginal utility and the other usually larger component quantifying the rate at which the utility of marginal income declines over time as per capita income increases.
One challenge to this view of public sector discounting comes from financial economics, where it is often argued that markets provide enough information about time preference. The risk-free public sector discount rate should therefore be the government borrowing rate. This challenge argues further that the benefits of public sector investment, such as time savings from better transport infrastructure, incur a cost of systematic risk (that is variability that is correlated with fluctuations in the equity market or GDP) and that this cost is equal to, or nearly equal to the risk premium that would be faced by the private financiers of such an activity, in a competitive financial market. However these challenges appear to follow from a belief that the fluctuations of equity markets are related only weakly if at all to the nature of these markets and investor behaviour. This view of the equity risk premium is not widely shared by economists from other backgrounds, and empirical evidence now casts doubt on it. There appears to be no evidence that the equity risk premium has any practical relevance to the social cost of public financing.
The other substantial challenge comes from economists who argue that the discount rate should be determined by the social rate of return that could otherwise be obtained from investing in the private sector; or that the STP rate should always be combined with a shadow price for public investment, reflecting this opportunity cost of displaced private investment. This arises in part from misunderstanding of how the public sector discount rates is used in practice. Most often the discount rate is used to compare public expenditure with later public expenditure savings. In this case there is no case for any opportunity cost adjustment, as it would apply equally to the costs and the benefits. However there is a robust analytical case for the public sector giving a higher weighting to public spending (public and capital) than to consumption benefits, because of the distortionary impacts of marginal taxation. Such a weighting is applied in many public administrations by the simple device of requiring a CBA benefit/cost ratio of significantly more than unity before any proposal is accepted. An alternative, administratively simpler approach would be to multiply all cost and benefits measured in a consumption numeraire by a factor less than 1, before comparing them with public expenditures.
The valuation of the two components of social time preference poses many problems. There is no significant empirical data on the extent to which people in general are concerned about the marginal utility of future populations. Judgments about this have therefore to be made at second hand, or alternatively by decision makers or advisers reflecting their own personal views on what weight society ought to give to future marginal welfare. The adoption of mortality data as a proxy for this ethical judgement, although fairly widely used, does not appear to have a sound analytical foundation.
The valuation of the elasticity of marginal utility, defining the extent to which future marginal income should be discounted because it brings less welfare to richer populations, has been approached in many ways, some of which have more merit than others. However no single method is free from weaknesses and a view needs to be taken from across a wide range of methods and of studies; although derivations from income tax schedules and from the income and supply elasticities of a good such as food appear to be the most useful.
Looking to the future, progress in this field woud be helped by clear recognition of the following issues.
Financial economics has developed since the 1960s in perpetual conflict with welfare economics, in its view of the effective completeness of financial markets and hence the relevance of equity risk premia to the social costs of public financing. Any country with a finance minister or senior official who is sympathetic to the traditional financial economics view of the public sector may well be steered towards the use of diverse CAPM rates of return for publicly financed activities, although this would seem to be against the public interest. It would be better for such a choice to be resolved by technical debate, well ahead of any such policy proposal. Welfare economics experts need in any case to understand, like Arrow, the history and implications of the EMH.
The 1960s debate about "SOC versus STP" has been resolved for many years in the literature, but not in practical application. Many advisers still wrongly perceive the (risk inclusive) return on private investment as an opportunity cost. Much progress would be made if it were generally understood that the two key factors for weighting future costs and benefits in cost-benefit analysis are: 1) a social time preference rate (for consumption, or for public spending or any other variable that has a fixed relationship to consumption); and 2) the social cost of public spending (because of the distorting effects of marginal taxation). The practical handling of these two key variables is open to many options, but there will be confusion and probably error wherever they are not clearly recognised as the key factors.
The public sector cost of capital, defined by its cost of debt, is rightly ignored in most public sector appraisal, as it is subsumed in the process of discounting at a (higher) STP rate. However for financing comparisons, such as with lease versus buy, or many "public-private partnership" options, the public cost of capital becomes relevant. One, usually adequate, approximation in such cases is to discount the alternative cost streams at the public sector cost of capital (with adjustment to remove the effects of corporate taxation and assurance that the public cost estimates are free from optimism bias). The more rigorous alternative of discounting both cost streams at an STP rate is too complex for general use, but it would be in the public interest for government economic advisers (other than those wedded to the EMH perspective of public financing costs, which denies any difference in the social cost of public and private financing) to recognise clearly the distinction between STP and the public sector cost of capital, and the fact that in financing comparisons, which have become much more common in recent decades, both are relevant.
The very long term is becoming increasingly important in policy analysis, with the emergence of environmental issues such as nuclear waste disposal and, especially, climate change. There are also compelling behavioural and statistical reasons for accepting that a discount rate that is appropriate for periods of several decades would be too high for much longer time horizons. However the calculation of present values of policy impacts extending into the very long term can divert attention from key, often ethical judgements, and many US experts prefer to seek other methods of data analysis and presentation. There appears to be no such methodological debate in Europe.
Conventions for discounting within government administrations need to be simple. The use of a social time preference rate and a shadow price for public spending relative to consumption (if it were applied as a multiplier less than unity to consumption values) would be simple enough for most administrations, but is unlikely to be widely accepted in the short term. In the absence of sufficient professional consensus to achieve such a nearoptimal system, there is much to be said for the German and American approaches of adopting a figure close to the cost of government debt (ideally with, as in the USA, special provisions for CBA, where quantities measured in consumption values are important). This also has the advantage allowing the same number to serve as a time preference rate and a cost of capital in comparing public and private financing options. Such a number is however likely to be significantly less that a social time preference rate.
It is encouraging that empirical work continues on the valuation of social time preference. A serious gap that remains unfilled, perhaps because it is beyond the scope of economics alone, is the absence of data on people's preference about the weight that the government should put on the marginal utility of future populations. With regard to quantifying the income elasticity of marginal utility, every approach appears to suffer major difficulties. Although the diversity of methods, and consistency at a very broad level, is encouraging, it would be wrong to put much weight on any one method and it would be good to see more examination of potential biases. For example the trend towards income tax schedules being designed to minimise disincentives rather improve income distribution seem likely to bias downwards elasticity estimates from such schedules; Transport (2001) 
